What is it that monetary policymakers do and how do they do it? The simple answer is that a central banker moves interesting rates in order to to maintain steady real growth and stable prices. In this essay, I examine the issues that arise in framing the problem faced by monetary policymakers. I begin with a discussion of how, over the past decade or so, central banks have been made more independent and more accountable. The result has been the virtual elimination of the in°ation bias problem that is caused by political interference in the monetary policy process, and better overall macroeconomic performance. The essay proceeds with an example of a formal version of the policymakers' problem, describing their objectives and the information they need to formulate a policy rule. I conclude with a discussion of simple versus complex policy rules, the impact of uncertainty a®ects policymaking, and how central bankers use formal modeling in making their day-to-day decisions.
Introduction
Over the past century, the prominence of central banks has steadily increased, to the point where hardly a day goes by without some mention of monetary policymakers appearing in the headlines. There is continuous speculation about the likely future actions of the worlds' central banks. Newspapers are¯lled with stories about the decisions to be taken by central banks in both the G7 and the emerging markets.
What is it that monetary policymakers do, and what accounts for their prominence in our daily lives?
Central bankers control interest rates in an e®ort to stabilize output and in°ation.
Changes in interest rates a®ect most of us directly through increases or decreases in the cost of borrowing, while stable prices and steady real growth make our economic and¯nancial planning much easier.
In most countries today, the central bankers are the only governmental authorities engaged in stabilization policy. Economists and policymakers now agree that¯scal policy, once thought to be capable of helping to smooth°uctuations in real growth, is not up to the task. Central banks are the sole remaining policymaking body thought capable of reducing business cycle°uctuations.
How should we think about the central banker's problem? The answer is relatively simple. Policy is, or should be, the solution to a complex control problem, similar in structure to the one faced by an airplane pilot. A pilot's objective is to use the plane's controls, given knowledge of the weather and the wind, to°y from one city to another. Similarly, a monetary policymaker's objective is to move interest rates, given knowledge of how the economy evolves, to maintain steady real growth and stable prices. In engineering, problems of this type are called optimal control problems, and they involve minimizing an objective or loss (the weighted sum of in°ation and output variability) subject to the evolution of the state (the economic structure describing the paths of output and in°ation) to yield a control rule (the monetary policy rule describing the reaction of the interest rate instrument).
This engineering approach yields what most people would call a policy rule. That is, monetary policymakers will have a rule in which the short-term interest rate reacts to observable measures of current economic activity. Much of the research into the normative question of how monetary policy should be made focuses on the how best to formulate these systematic rules. Taylor (this volume) refers to this as \The New Normative Macroeconomics."
The purpose of this essay is to examine issues that arise in framing the central bankers problem. I will outline and comment on the policymaker's control problem in several steps ,beginning with a very brief description of recent developments in the conduct of monetary policy and how institutions have been redesigned over the past decade. Central banks have been made independent and accountable for meeting speci¯c objectives, leading to the elimination of the in°ation bias that arises from political interference in the monetary policy process. A description of the source of the in°ation bias and the solution is the topic of Section 3. This provides a backdrop for the detailed examination of monetary policy objectives contained in Section 4.
Next, in Section 5, I present an explicit example of a problem with its solution, and discuss the general properties of the resulting policy rules. Even this relatively simple model is quite useful, and in Section 6, I take up a discussion of the simple versus more complex policy rules and the Taylor rule. Section 7 addresses the all important issue of monetary policy making under uncertainty. How is it that policy making is a®ected by imperfect knowledge of various kinds? In the¯nal section I provide a brief discussion of how it is that modeling is used by central bankers in making their day-to-day decisions.
Recent Developments in the Conduct of Monetary Policy
During the 1990s, there was a convergence around the world in the goals and methods used to conduct monetary policy. A number of forces are responsible for this development. First, during the 1970s and 1980s, many countries experienced very high levels of in°ation, with prices rise well in excess of 50 percent per year for extended periods.
1 This led to a clear consensus that even moderate levels of in°ation damage real growth and that low in°ation must therefore be a primary objective of monetary policy. Casual observation suggests that low-in°ation countries experience higher growth rates, and so there are strong incentives to devise ways in which to keep in°ation low. 
Avoiding the In°ation Bias
Today, the central banks of the world share several common features. First, for the most part they are independent. As noted by King (1999) , this is a relatively recent phenomena. In fact, only in the last few years were the Bank of England and the Bank of Japan were granted independence from their¯nance ministries when taking interest rate decisions.
At¯rst glance, the granting of independence to a governmental institution as powerful as a central bank seems odd. In fact, as Blinder (1997) has pointed out, there is a potential con°ict between central bank independence and representative democracy. Since one of the crucial elements of a democratic society is that powerful policymakers are accountable to the people, how can we square accountability with independence? The answer is that independent central banks are generally given clear objectives and then held publicly accountable for meeting them.
The evidence is now overwhelming that independent, but accountable, central banks yield better overall policy and macroeconomic outcomes. The changes have worked. As Cecchetti and Krause (2001) discuss in detail, the variability of both in°ation and output are lower today than they were a decade ago. The reason is largely improvements in the e±ciency with which policymakers have been doing their jobs.
Nearly 20 years ago, Barro and Gordon (1983) noted that if a policymaker cannot credibly commit to a zero in°ation policy, then even if he or she announces that in°ation will be zero, and all private decisions are based on the assumption that in°ation will in fact be zero, it is in the policymaker's interest to renege and induce an increase in the aggregate price level. The reason for this is that at zero in°ation the value of the increase in output obtained from fooling private agents and creating a transitory increase in output (along a Phillips-or Lucas-supply curve) more than o®sets the cost of the higher in°ation, and so the claim of zero in°ation in the absence of commitment is not credible. In the language of optimal control, a zero in°ation policy is not dynamically consistent.
Since the problem is most severe when potentially short-sighted legislators are capable of in°uencing central bank policy directly, the prominent solution has been to create independent central banks. It is commonly thought, and the data con¯rm, that policymakers who are more independent are better able to make credible commitments to low-in°ation policy.
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There is some dispute over how the seriousness of the in°ation bias problem. Blinder (1997) With this in mind, now return to the task at hand | the formulation of an objective for monetary policy. In the remainder of this section, I will discuss various reasons we might ask central banks to stabilize prices and output. I will also discuss at some length why it is that they smooth interest rates, and how this is a consequence of their actions, not an objective in and of itself. One cost of in°ation is the tax on the money that we hold. More speci¯cally, it is a tax on the monetary base. But the monetary base, currency plus reserves, is quite small, and so the tax is really very modest. The in°ation tax is the erosion in the value of the monetary base caused by in°ation, scaled by the size of the economy. This is just the level of the base times in°ation, relative to nominal GNP. A second cost of in°ation relates to taxes. The tax system in most countries is not properly indexed, and so there are welfare losses associated with in°ation. In particular, the failure to accurately index taxes on capital gains leads to underinvestment and a capital stock that is too small. Overall, then, an economy with in°ation will have a lower permanently level of output. The papers in Feldstein (1999) show that these e®ects can be quite substantial, and so it may be worth paying a fairly high price to reduce in°ation to near zero.
Stabilizing Prices
Beyond tax distortions, in°ation creates noise in the price system. That is, when there is aggregate price in°ation, it becomes more di±cult to discern changes in relative prices. Movements in one price relative to another are the basis for resource allocation. When this system is damaged, allocations become less e±cient and the economy does not operate as smoothly as it could. It is very di±cult to get a sense of the scale of this cost, but it seems likely to be fairly small.
Yet a fourth cost of in°ation is that at high levels of in°ation, people tend to invest substantial time and e®ort into¯nding ways to reduce its costs. Several examples come to mind. First, in countries that experience in°ation in the range of 100+%
per year, the¯nancial sector grows out of proportion with the rest of the economy.
There are too many banks, too many short-term and indexed¯nancial instruments, and too much overall energy put into monitoring the value of ones money. Second, retailers of durable goods must¯nd ways to change prices that are relatively low cost.
This usually involves investment in information technology that would otherwise be unnecessary.
Finally, there is the empirical fact that high in°ation is uncertain in°ation. Looking around the world, we cannot point to any examples of high and steady in°ation.
Instead, when in°ation rises, there is an increase in uncertainty of future in°ation.
The costs of this are potentially quite high, as it makes long-term planning more di±cult. Both individuals formulating retirement plans and companies making investment decisions face di±cult problems when confronted with uncertainty about the path of future prices.
This last point is very much at the heart of the problem. If we could have high and stable in°ation, some of the costs would go away. A guaranteed level of say 10%
in°ation per year, with only small deviations, might probably promote adjustment in the tax code and the like that would reduce the costs. But there are two things wrong with this line of reasoning. First, the fact that we should not have to pay to move to a world with a high steady in°ation rate, and second the¯rmly held belief that high in°ation policies are not credible.
Overall, central bankers now agree that the costs of in°ation are high, and that variable in°ation entails signi¯cant social losses. As a result, the primary objective of monetary policy, and the one that appears to be within the grasp of the policymakers, is to stabilize in°ation about a level that is low enough that it becomes irrelevant for household and¯rm decision-making.
The only remaining question is then what level of in°ation should be the tar-
get. The answer to this is still the subject of substantial debate. Cecchetti and Groshen (forthcoming) address the issue of how to choose an optimal in°ation rate.
We note that when prices adjust infrequently, in°ation distorts price signals and leads to resource misallocations. But if wages and prices are rigid downward, some amount of in°ation facilitates adjustment to real shocks. Recent research has produced measures of the relative size of these costs and bene¯ts in an economy that suggest that in°ation targets between zero and 2 percent, after adjusting for the known upward bias in traditional price indices, 8 are optimal.
Price-Level vs. In°ation Stabilization
Before we move on to discuss the arguments for including output stability in the central bank's objective, it is worth addressing one more subject that has attracted increasing attention in recent years. Should policy target the in°ation rate or the path of the aggregate price level? A recent paper by Gaspar and Smets (2000) discusses the relative merits of pricelevel vs. in°ation stabilization in detail. Depending on the structure of the economy, and especially on the persistence of output deviations from trend, price-level targeting may result in a lower variance of prices, without an increase in the variance of output.
In general, it appears that a partial reversion to the price-level is warranted. King (1999) describes why he believes that the distinction between price-level and in°ation-rate targeting is irrelevant in practice. He plausibly suggests that if a central bank is held to an in°ation target on average over a relatively long horizon of ten years or so, then it becomes a price-level target. The logic is straightforward. Consider a in°ation target of 2% on average for a decade. Asking whether the monetary policy met this target is the same as asking whether the price level is close to 1:02 10 = 1:22 surement bias. 9 This issue has been studied recently by Svensson (1999a) , Dittmar and Gavin (2000) and Vestin (2000) . The result, described very nicely in Parkin (2000) is that if output is su±ciently persistent, then price-level targeting yields the same output variability but lower in°ation variability than does in°ation targeting. times where is it was ten years earlier. The deviation of ten-year in°ation from 22% would be measure of the success of the policy. This is price-level targeting.
King's observation that in°ation and price-level targeting are really the same at long horizons has important implications for the behavior of both prices and policymakers. First, even with in°ation targeting the variance of the price level is unlikely to increase without bound. Instead, this variance will peak at some medium-term horizon at which policymakers will feel constrained to bring prices back to the path implied by the target. Second, policymaking will be driven by a constant desire to bring prices back to this same path so that in°ation averages the target level over a long horizon.
Overall, we can conclude that there is a convincing argument for price stabilization. Only two issues remain unresolved. First, should we allow for base drift, or insist on targeting a the price level? And second, should we target zero in°ation or should the target be slightly positive? Beyond these questions, things are basically resolved.
Stabilizing Output
Is it desirable for policy to attempt to stabilize output? In 1987 Robert Lucas estimated that elimination of the post-World War II variability in U.S. consumption would have the same welfare impact as an increase in consumption of something like one-tenth of one percentage point. As I write this in the fall of 2000, per capita U.S. consumption is approximately $24,500, implying that we would be willing to pay slightly less than $25 apiece (annually) to eliminate business cycles.
Lucas proposes \taking these numbers seriously as giving the order-of-magnitude of the potential marginal social product of additional advances in business cycle theory | or more accurately, as a loose upper bound, since there is no reason to think that eliminated all consumption variability is either a feasible or desirable objective of policy (Lucas 1987, pg. 27) ." Furthermore, implementation of an activist policy always risks destabilizing the economy.
There are two counters to Lucas. The¯rst is that the burden of business cycles is very unequal across the economy, and so in the interests of equity we may wish to do something about it.
10 But the second response is more powerful: volatility and growth are related. That is, a stable economy grows more rapidly. Ramey and Ramey (1995) who present evidence that, in a broad group of 95 countries, there is a strong negative correlation between volatility and growth. They go on to suggest that the source of this may be the fact that¯rms are more likely to engage in long-lived investment projects, whose payo®s may be spread over many years, if they believe that the world is a stable place.
What Ramey and Ramey¯nd to be true across countries on average over long historical periods also seems to be true within a country over time. McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) provide some interesting evidence for the U.S. on the relationship of growth to volatility. They show that there has been a dramatic reduction in the volatility of real U.S. GDP since 1984, and go on to attribute the break to changes in inventory management policies. Taylor (1999) notes the same fact about volatility, but ascribes it to improved monetary policy. Regardless of the cause, the fact is that the lower variability of output has come with a steady increase in the sustainable growth rate of the economy, suggesting that Lucas's simple calculations are not the end of the story.
Overall, including a role for output stabilization in central bank objectives seems prudent. The only issue is how important should it be relative to price stability when formulating the objective. Here, the answer is that it may not matter. As Svensson (1999a) has pointed out, the more important output variability is in the policymaker's objective function, the slower the return of in°ation to its target. That is, the longer the horizon over which the policymaker is expected to meet the in°ation objective, the more importance is implicitly being attributed to output in the loss function.
The Svensson result is very intuitive. If the policymaker is faced with a short-run trade-o® between stabilizing output and stabilizing in°ation, the longer the horizon over which in°ation can be stabilized the more scope there is for short-run output stabilization.
Stabilizing Interest Rates
Central banks tend to change their policy instrument in sequences of small steps, generally continuing in the same direction. Reversals are much less frequent. Looking at interest rate data, we see that there is substantial inertia. Goodhart (1999) there is uncertainty about parameters of the model. When the central bank is unsure about the impact of an interest rate movement, they will act more prudently and respond gradually to changes in the environment in order to assure that unintended volatility is not introduced into the system. I will return to these last two points in Section 7.
My conclusion is that the objective of monetary policy should be the stabilization of the domestic economy through the reduction in the variability of prices and output growth. Optimal policy may entail interest rate smoothing, but there is no justi¯cation for this to be an explicit objective.
A Simple Analytical Framework: Finding the Policy Rule
A framework for analyzing this problem has two components: the objective function to me minimized and the structure of the economy that acts as a constraint on behavior. We will consider each of these, and then discuss the solution to the problem that is the policy rule.
The Objective Function
The simplest, and most commonly used, objective function assumes that the policymaker seeks to minimize the squared deviations of output and prices from their target paths. The general form of such a loss function (measured over a medium-term horizon of three or four years) can be written as
where E denotes the mathematical expectation, ¼ is the deviation of in°ation from its target, y is the the (proportional) deviation of aggregate output from its "potential", or full capacity, level, and ® is the weight given to squared deviations of output from its desired level. 11 The parameter ® is the crucial quantity of interest, and we will call it the policymaker's in°ation variability aversion. When alpha tends to in¯nity the policymaker cares only about in°ation, and when alpha tends to zero (s)he cares only about output.
It is worth making one technical comments about equation (1). As I have written it, the objective function is symmetrical, including only quadratic terms. The implication is that policymakers care equally about extreme positive and extreme negative events. This is surely not the case: we would expect policymakers to take action when the mean and variance of forecast distributions are likely to stay the same, while the probability of some extreme bad event increases. That is, even if the variance is unchanged, an increase in the possibility of a severe economic downturn is likely to prompt action. Nevertheless, we will continue with this simple functional form, as anything more complex is unlikely to be mathematically tractable.
The Structure of the Economy
The second component of the analytical framework is a set of linkages among the economic quantities of interest. This is a structural economic model, and such models are potentially very complex. The more involved the structural model of the economy, the more di±cult it will be to¯nd the optimal policy rule for the monetary authority, and the more complicated that rule will be. As a result, I will examine the policymaker's problem using the simplest setup that is capable of delivering the primary lessons about monetary policy rules.
The minimum requirement is a set of relationships linking deviations of the log of output from its potential level (y), the deviation from in°ation from its target (¼), and the interest rate instrument (r), which here is taken to be the real interest rate.
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Crucial for the purpose here is that there are two kinds of disturbances bu®eting the economy and that require policy responses. The¯rst shock | the aggregate demand shock (d) | moves output and in°ation in the same direction; the second shock | the aggregate supply shock (s) | moves output and in°ation in opposite directions. Policy is only capable of moving output and in°ation in the same direction, and so is analogous to an aggregate demand shock.
A simple textbook aggregate demand and aggregate supply is su±cient for the task at hand. Following Bean (1998) , write the aggregate demand and aggregate supply curves as
and
where ! is the slope of the aggregate supply function and¸is a constant. Any dynamics in aggregate supply are suppressed for simplicity: I assume that policy is credible and so that in°ation is always near its target, in the way suggested by equation (3).
After substituting output, equation (2), into the aggregate supply curve (3), we obtain the simple reduced form relations
instrument in deviations from the equilibrium value that it would need to have in order that output be equal to its potential level. To treat the real interest rate as the instrument of monetary policy is a simpli¯cation, but, in the sticky-price world being examined here, all that is needed for this is that the monetary authorities change the interest rate su±ciently often, and su±ciently decisively, to remain "ahead of the game". That is, I assume that they are able to change the nominal interest rate enough to prevent changes in in°ation expectations from sabotaging the way in which they want the real interest rate to respond to conditions in the economy.
The Policy Rule
The quadratic objective and linear economic structure means that the optimal policy response to demand and supply shocks is a simple linear rule. That is, the instrument response is of the form r = ad + bs;
where a and b are the degree to which policy reacts to the two shocks.
Minimizing the loss, subject to the constraint imposed by the structure of economy, yields optimal values for the reaction parameters a and b. Call these a ¤ and b ¤ . The result is that policy o®sets aggregate demand shocks one-for-one, and so a ¤ is equal
The response to supply shocks is more complex, as they create a trade-o® for policy. Faced with a shock that moves in°ation but not output, and an instrument that moves them both, the policymaker must make a choice. Stabilizing either output or in°ation, destabilizes the other, creating the output-in°ation variability trade-o®.
The extent of the reaction to a supply shock then depends on policymaker's aversion to in°ation variability (®), as well as the slope of aggregate supply, measured by !.
The loss-minimizing solution for b is given by
The form The optimal policy has several implications for the variability of output and in-°a tion. In particular, both depend only on the variance of aggregate supply shocks, not on the variance of demand shocks. 13 This follows immediately from the fact that the optimal policy rule dictates that demand shocks be o®set completely by interest rate moves. 14 Second, changes in the volatility of aggregate supply shocks shift the variance of output and in°ation in the same proportion.
As a result, we can derive the following ratio:
This expression has several interesting properties. First, note that when ® = 0 (the policymaker cares only about output variability), ¾ 
Interpretations
This simple framework can be used to help understand a number of points that have been raised in the recent debate over the conduct of monetary policy. I will comment on three: alternative targeting regimes, target rules versus instrument rule, and inferring policymakers preferences. In the Section 6, I will take up a discussion of simple versus complex policy rules, and the Taylor rule.
Alternative Targeting Regimes
Given the optimal control view of the policymaker's problem how can we interpret the current debate over the proper choice of a policy target, or the advisability ¤ is the optimal reaction to s t in equation (7). 14 If the policymaker can only respond to demand shocks with a lag, then it will no longer be possible to neutralize them completely. Instead, policy will only be able to eliminate the future e®ects of current shocks. . This will complicate the tradeo® between output and in°ation. See Bean (1998) for a discussion. 
2 . That is, the policymaker would be instructed to be averse to squared deviations of nominal income from its optimal path. There are three di®erences between this and the loss function written as of the weighted sum on output and in°ation variability. First, the weights need not be equal, and so ® may di®er from one half. Second, nominal income targeting is based on the behavior the path of real output and the price level, and so will in general be inconsistent with 15 Researchers do not claim to care about money for its own sake, nor do they claim that central banks can control it exactly.
Therefore, monetary aggregates are neither a direct objective nor an instrument.
Instead, they are somewhere in between. They are intermediate targets.
I¯nd it di±cult to make a coherent argument for intermediate targets. helps forecast prices, then it will be included in the model. But there is substantial evidence, some of which is in Cecchetti (1995) , that reduced-form in°ation forecasting relationships are very unstable even if they include M2, or any other potential intermediate target.
As a result, the only case I can see for intermediate targeting is that it contributes to policy transparency. To quote Svensson (1999b) , the ideal intermediate target \is
highly correlated with the goal, easier to control than the goal, easier to observe by both the central bank and the public than the goal, and transparent so that central bank communication with the public and public understanding and public prediction of monetary policy are facilitated" (pp.14-15). Monetary aggregates seem particularly poorly suited to such a task.
Target Rules vs. Instrument Rules
15 For a recent discussion of M2 targeting, see Feldstein and Stock (1994) . Svensson's (1999b) distinction between a target rule and an instrument rule is also useful here. As he de¯nes it, an instrument rule is a relationship between the control variable and the observable state | equivalent to (6). So, an instrument rule is a statement that the interest rate will be raised or lowered by a speci¯c amount following a aggregate demand or aggregate supply shocks of a certain size. By contrast, the statement that the policymaker adjusts the instrument such that in°ation and/or output will follow a certain speci¯ed path is a target rule. This is not a policy per se, but really just a statement about a relationship that is implied by the control problem. Target rules still require instrument rules for implementation.
Inferring Policymakers Preferences
Cecchetti and Ehrmann (2001) use this simple model to infer policymakers' in°ation variability aversion. What we do is to estimate ® for a broad cross-section of countries. We note that if we assume policymakers are acting optimally, then their actions reveal their objectives. Given the structure of the economy, summarized by the parameter ! in (5), the observed level of output and in°ation variability allow us to estimate the parameter ®.
The motivation for that study is the set observations in Section 2. That is, the increase in the number of countries that focus on in°ation as a policy objective. One interpretation of a move to in°ation targeting is that the preferences of monetary policymakers have changed, with many central banks exhibiting increasing aversion to in°ation variability and decreasing aversion to output variability.
Ehrmann and I estimate the change in the preferences of monetary policymakers in a cross-section of 23 countries, including 9 that target in°ation explicitly. Wē nd evidence that in all countries, whether they target in°ation or not, aversion to in°ation variability increased during the decade of the 1990s. Furthermore, we show that the in°ation targeters increased their aversion to in°ation volatility by more than the nontargeters, suggesting that the move to in°ation targeting led to some increase in output volatility.
6 Simple versus Complex Rules and the Taylor Rule
There is now an extensive literature examining the robustness of simple policy rules. The papers in Taylor (1999) are examples. This research studies the performance of simple rules that react to only in°ation and output, and possibly exchange rates, in the context of complex structural models. I will use the framework here to interpret these exercises.
It is helpful to distinguish among several ways in which we can write policy rules.
First, there are rules that are written in terms of shocks, as in the case of equation (6) of my example, as compared with those that are written in terms of the observable economic variables. In the latter category we can di®erentiate between rules specifying reaction to changes in the objectives alone and those that allow for reaction to other
things. Yet another distinction is between rules that react to only current variables and those that allow for reactions to past or lagged events.
When dealing with optimal rules, the distinction between those that react to observables and those that react to shocks is actually immaterial. The reason is that any loss minimizing rule will always specify a set of reactions to new information. That is, the instrument will respond to the shocks. Depending on the dynamic structure of the economy, these responses could be complex, but that will be all there is.
The Taylor-rule,¯rst introduced in Taylor (1993) , is an example of a simple rule that is written in terms of objectives. Taylor suggests that interest rates be set based on the distance that output and in°ation are from their target paths. We can write this as r =°¼¼ +°yy (9) where°¼ and°y are constants.
There are many models in which the optimal interest rate response can be written as a Taylor rule, this will not generally be the case. There are a number of reasons why this might be so. Cecchetti, Flores Lagunes and Krause (2000) allows for operation o® the frontier, and examines improvements in the e±ciency of policymakers as well as changes in their preferences.
The¯rst reason is that, in some cases, writing the rule in terms of objectives may mean that, for any reasonable parameters, it cannot cause the policy instrument to respond optimally to shocks. The simple example developed in Section 5 is one case in which this is true. To see why, substitute the reduced form equations (4) and (5) into equation (9). This can be rewritten as
which is in the same form as the linear interest rate rule (6). But it is straightforward to show that, for this particular case, there are no values of°¼ and°y such that the coe±cients in (10) on d and s equal a ¤ and b ¤ . To see this, simply note that the coe±cient on d in (10) implies that
However, we know from the previous section that a ¤ =¸¡ 1 , which means that the right hand side of equation (11) is in¯nitely large, requiring that one or both of°¼ and°y must be in¯nitely large. The optimal rule thus cannot sensibly be expressed in this form. 17 The second reason is that there is no reason to believe that outcomes for a small set of objectives, here in°ation and output, are capable of adequately summarizing the e®ects of shocks hitting the economy. In particular in a real worlds economy in which both shocks and policy take time to have e®ect there may be shocks which are known to have hit, or be about to hit, the economy, whose e®ects on output and in°ation have not yet been observed. Good policy will want to be pre-emptive in such circumstances, and a simple Taylor rule, in which policy is constrained to respond only to current output and in°ation, does not allow this to be done.
Does this mean that it is better for policymakers to use more complex rules than a simple rule such as that suggested by Taylor? The answer is probably yes. An important relevant case is examined in some detail in Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky and Wadhwani (1999) , who look at the e±cacy of reacting to asset prices generally.
That study¯nds that a central bank concerned with most combinations of output and in°ation variability (a wide range of ®'s), can improve performance by modifying their policy rule to include not only in°ation and output, but also asset price misalignments.
That is, macroeconomic stability is enhanced if policy responds to the emergence of stock price and exchange rate movements . This will be especially true if it appears likely that asset prices are movements include the e®ects of bubbles which are likely to be reversed at a later date.
The lesson of this section is that central banks can almost always improve on simple rules, because the simpler ones are not optimal. There is no reason to believe that information on output and in°ation is always capable of adequately summarizing what policy needs to do to respond to the shocks hitting the economy. As a result, judiciously chosen but complex policy rules will almost always be better than simple ones.
Monetary Policy Making Under Uncertainty
When it was suggested that the European Central Bank (ECB) hold a conference on monetary policy making under uncertainty, the ECB's Chief Economist Otmar
Issing responded \Is there any other kind?" 18 Only in our stylized models is there certainty. Practical advice to central bankers must be made in the context of a framework that explicitly considers uncertainty. This has been the subject of a large body of research in recent years. I have already mentioned the work of Sack and Weiland (1999) , and now I will elaborate on some of the issues that have been raised.
Uncertainty can be divided into three categories. Using the terminology introduced in Section 5, there is uncertainty about current economic conditions where the policymaker cannot observe s and d perfectly, there is uncertainty about the parameters of the model where ! cannot be measured accurately, and there is uncertainty about the model itself where the relationships (2) and (3) may not be correctly 18 The conference is summarized in Angeloni, Smets and Weber (1999) . That proceedings volume provides a summary of the broad range of issues raised by introducing uncertainty into central bank decision-making.
speci¯ed.
Analysis of the¯rst two of these can proceed in the context of the example. Thē rst result, for which Svensson and Woodford (2000) provide a general proof, is that with a quadratic objective function, optimal policy is una®ected by uncertainty about the state of the economy. Instead, policymakers should respond in the same way to their best forecast of the shocks as they would if they new the shocks. This result comes from certainty equivalence, and should not be surprising. In the example, note that the solutions for the optimal responses, a ¤ and b ¤ do not depend on the variances of the demand and supply shocks, and so they will not change if those variances change. From the point of view of the policymakers, introducing noise into the data is exactly equivalent to increasing the variance of the shocks.
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Parameter uncertainty is an entirely di®erent matter. This problem,¯rst examined by Brainard (1967) , has now been studied extensively. In its simplest form,
Brainard uncertainty reduces the reaction to any shock. That is, if we have an estimate of ! that has a variance ¾ ! , then b ¤ will be negatively related to ¾ ! . The bigger the uncertainty about the reaction of output to an interest rate change, the less sensitive the policy will be to a given size shock. The intuition for this is that the policymaker will be concerned that the ! may be very small (recall that b ¤ is inversely related to !) and not want to take the risk of destabilizing the economy.
More recently, researchers have noted that parameter uncertainty may not always breed caution. SÄ oderstrÄ om (1999) discusses how, if in°ation is very persistent, uncertainty about the e®ective of policy will cause policymakers to be more aggressive.
The logic is straightforward. Since central banks want to keep in°ation low, if a mistake can drive in°ation up for a long time, they will want to make sure that does not happen. Uncertainty about the impact of interest rate changes on in°ation will create concern that the policy action might be too timid. Too small an interest rate move, when in°ation is very persistent, results in poor long-term performance. Insuring against this possibility means more aggressive, not more conservative, policy actions.
In the end this is an empirical issue. My own view is that the persistence of the in°ation process depends crucially on the monetary policy framework that is in place, and the ability of the central bankers to behave credibly. With a credible, low-in°ation policy, in°ation will not become persistent in its movements away from the publicly speci¯ed target, and so policymakers can a®ord to be conservative. The fact that interest rate changes are smaller than our models predict they should be is at least prima facie evidence for this position.
Finally, what about model uncertainty? The problems here are quite serious, and the solution taken by the policymakers is that they are not too tied to the results for any particular model. For economists studying monetary policy, the most useful strategy is the one suggested by McCallum (1997) who argues convincingly that since there is little agreement over the true structural economic model, a policy rule should be robust to the possibility that numerous models are correct.
8 Making Monetary Policy in the Real World
Setting interest rates is still more of an art than a science. No one would want to replace central bankers with computers programmed to follow systematic rules based on an optimal control problem of the type I have described | at least, not yet. What is it then, that policymakers do, and how do they use macroeconomic models and academically generated policy rules?
As Donald Kohn (1999) writes, policymakers themselves \seem to regard the use of rules to guide policy as questionable in part because they are quite uncertain about the quantitative speci¯cations of the most basic inputs required by most rules." Among other things, implementation of speci¯c policy rules usually requires assumptions about the current level of potential output and the equilibrium exchange rate and interest rate. We are unfortunately ill-informed about all of these.
But central bankers do have some use for policy rules. In fact, I am fairly certain that internal central bank documents include estimates of interest rate levels implied by a broad array of possible rules. These Taylor-style policy reaction functions are estimated using historical data and so they summarize previous policymakers decisions 20 Taylor (this volume) provides exactly this type of evaluation of a set of policy rules.
in how to move interest rates in reaction to prices, output and possible exchange rate movements.
Kohn suggests that by providing this link with the past, estimated rules help provide a benchmark for the stance of policy, giving current policymakers a sense of how their predecessors (or their former selves) would have reacted under current circumstances. In addition, rules help to structure the massive amount of incoming information. While it is perceived (probably correctly) as dangerous to be dogmatic about rules, it is helpful to think that the proper policy stance is probably a®ected by the way in which new data a®ect forecasts about in°ation, output, exchange rates and long-term real interest rates.
Even though central bankers do not following easily articulated rules when they adjust their policies, what they actually do is to follow procedures that are ad hoc versions of solving an optimal control problem. As Alan Budd (1998) suggests, policymakers move interest rates in such a way as to make their forecasts of their in°ation and output match up with their targets. That is, they adjust their instrument to make sure that the expected future the state of the economy follows along a path that meets their objectives. This means that they, implicitly or explicitly they are using structural models and reaction functions. This is where the study of policy rules comes into play. Central bankers will inevitably set interest rates by reacting to changing economic and¯nancial conditions in order to meet a certain set of objectives. There will always be better or worse ways of doing this, and so the study of policy rules informs these actions, helping to improve the outcomes.
